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Abstract— Wireless networks with directional antennas, like
millimeter wave (mmWave) networks, have enhanced security.
For a large-scale mmWave ad hoc network in which eaves-
droppers are randomly located, however, eavesdroppers can still
intercept the confidential messages, since they may reside in the
signal beam. This paper explores the potential of physical layer
security in mmWave ad hoc networks. Specifically, we charac-
terize the impact of mmWave channel characteristics, random
blockages, and antenna gains on the secrecy performance. For
the special case of uniform linear array (ULA), a tractable
approach is proposed to evaluate the average achievable secrecy
rate. We also characterize the impact of artificial noise in such
networks. Our results reveal that in the low transmit power
regime, the use of low mmWave frequency achieves better secrecy
performance, and when increasing transmit power, a transition
from low mmWave frequency to high mmWave frequency is
demanded for obtaining a higher secrecy rate. More antennas at
the transmitting nodes are needed to decrease the antenna gain
obtained by the eavesdroppers when using ULA. Eavesdroppers
can intercept more information by using a wide beam pattern.
Furthermore, the use of artificial noise may be ineffective for
enhancing the secrecy rate.
Index Terms— Ad hoc, millimeter wave, beamforming, uniform
linear array, average achievable secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS ad hoc networks have been widely appliedin several areas including tactical networks, device-
to-device, and personal area networking. Unfortunately,
interference from nearby transmitters severely deteriorate the
throughput of ad hoc networks either through reducing the
link quality, or reducing the number of links that can operate
simultaneously. Due to the lack of central coordination, beam-
forming or directional antennas are one approach for suppress-
ing interference [2]. Recently, millimeter wave (mmWave)
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has been viewed as a promising technology for supporting
high-speed data rate in the mobile cellular systems [3].
MmWave with directional transmissions and large bandwidths
provides rich opportunities for ad hoc networks. Compared
to the lower frequency counterpart, mmWave ad hoc
networks experience less interference and achieve greater rate
coverage [4].
Security in ad hoc networks is important [5]. The traditional
higher-layer key distribution and management may increase
the burden of transmitting confidential messages in such
decentralized networks. Recent developments have shown that
by leveraging the randomness inherent in wireless channels,
physical layer security can be a low-complexity alternative
for safeguarding complex wireless networks [6]. By taking
advantage of unique mmWave channel features, this paper
establishes the potential of physical layer security in mmWave
ad hoc networks.
A. Related Works and Motivation
Early work has studied the effects of channel fading on
physical layer security, see, e.g., [7], [8] and the refer-
ences therein. The implementation of cooperative jamming
and artificial noise can degrade the eavesdropper’s channel
and further improve secrecy [6], [9]. Recently, new network
architectures and emerging transmission technologies such
as heterogeneous networks (HetNets) and massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) have promoted more research
on physical layer security. In HetNets, dense small cells are
deployed, which results in ubiquitous inter-tier and intra-
tier interference. For secrecy communications at the physi-
cal layer, such interference can be utilized for confounding
the eavesdroppers. In [10], spectrum allocation and transmit
beamforming were designed for maximizing the secrecy rate in
a two-tier HetNet. In [11], an access threshold-based secrecy
mobile association policy was proposed in a K -tier HetNet.
Massive MIMO uses large number of antennas to provide high
array gains for legitimate receivers. The work of [12] studied
the case of jamming when the transmitter equipped with large
number of antennas served one single-antenna receiver. It was
shown in [13] that the application of random artificial noise
in massive MIMO cellular networks can achieve a better
performance/complexity tradeoff compared to the conventional
null space based artificial noise. In [14], secrecy and energy
efficiency in massive MIMO aided heterogeneous C-RAN
was studied, which showed that the centralized and distrib-
uted large-scale antenna systems can coexist to enhance the
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secrecy and cut power consumption. While the aforementioned
literature has provided a solid understanding of physical layer
security in the wireless systems with lower-frequency bands
(sub-6 GHz), the research on mmWave secrecy communication
is in its infancy.
Physical layer security in decentralized wireless networks
such as sensor and ad hoc type of networks has been inves-
tigated in [15]–[18]. In [15], secrecy transmission capacity
under connection outage and secrecy outage concerns was
examined in an ad hoc network, in which both legitimate
nodes and eavesdroppers are randomly distributed. In [16], the
average achievable secrecy rate was examined in a three-tier
sensor networks consisting of sensors, access points and sinks,
and it was shown that there exists optimal number of access
points for maximizing the average achievable secrecy rate.
Secrecy enhancement in ad hoc networks was studied in [17],
where two schemes for the generation of artificial noise were
compared. In [18], relay transmission in ad hoc networks was
evaluated from the perspective of security connectivity. Again,
these works solely focus on the lower-frequency secrecy
communications in decentralized wireless networks.
Due to the peculiar mmWave channel characteristics,
physical layer security in mmWave systems has recently
attracted much interest [19]–[22]. In [19], mmWave
antenna subset modulation was designed to secure point-
to-point communication by introducing randomness in the
received constellation, which confounds the eavesdropper.
In [20], the mmWave multiple-input, single-output, multiple-
eavesdroppers channel was considered in a single cell, and
it was indicated that high-speed secure link at the mmWave
frequencies could be reached with the assistance of large
antenna arrays and large mmWave bandwidths. The work
of [21] illustrated the impacts of key factors such as large
bandwidth and directionality on the physical layer security
in mmWave networks, and provided more opportunities and
challenges in this field. In [22], it was shown that even
only one eavesdropper may be able to successfully intercept
highly directional mmWave transmission. In the work of [22],
although the eavesdropper was located outside the signal
beam, reflections could be exploited by the eavesdropper that
used small-scale reflectors within the beam, which has little
blockage effect on the legitimate receiver’s performance.
Secrecy outage of an mmWave cellular network was analyzed
in [23], where authorized users and eavesdroppers were
assumed to be single-omnidirectional-antenna nodes. In [24],
secrecy outage of a mmWave overlaid microwave network
was derived by considering a specific blockage model and
assuming that mmWave channel undergoes Nakagami-m
fading for tractability. In two-way amplify-and-forward
MIMO relaying networks, [25] proposed mmWave secrecy
beamforming schemes to maximize the secrecy sum rate.
Prior work only pays attention to the physical layer security
in lower-frequency ad hoc networks. In mmWave ad hoc
networks, the directional communication with narrow beam
is more robust against eavesdropping. The mmWave link is
sensitive to the blockage and experiences higher propagation
loss, and mmWave channel undergoes rapid fluctuation and
has much lower coherence time than the today’s networks
because of much larger Doppler spread [26]. Hence mmWave
link is more random and hard to be intercepted by malicious
eavesdroppers compared to the low-frequency counterpart.
B. Approach and Contributions
This paper studies physical layer security in mmWave ad
hoc networks. Our analysis accounts for the key features
of mmWave channel and the effects of different antenna
array gains and node densities. The detailed contributions and
insights are summarized as follows.
• We model the mmWave ad hoc networks with the
help of stochastic geometry, to characterize the random
spatial locations of transmitting nodes and eavesdrop-
pers. The effect of blockage is also incorporated such
that links are either line-of-sight (LoS) or non-line-of-
sight (NLoS). The average achievable secrecy rate is
derived to quantify the impacts of key system parameters
such as antenna gain, transmitting node and eavesdropper
densities on the secrecy performance. Our results show
that with increasing transmit power, a transition from low
mmWave frequency to high mmWave frequency is needed
for achieving better secrecy performance. Compared to
eavesdropping, the performance is dominated by the sur-
rounding interference in the high node density case. The
use of different mmWave frequencies has a big impact
on the secrecy performance, which needs to be carefully
selected in practice.
• We develop an approach to evaluate the average
achievable secrecy rate when utilizing uniform linear
array (ULA). Our results show that adding more antennas
at the transmitting node decreases antenna gains obtained
by eavesdroppers.
• We examine the impact of artificial noise on the secrecy
rate. Our results show that in mmWave ad hoc networks,
the use of artificial noise can still enhance the secrecy
when power allocation between the information signal
and artificial noise is properly set. Moreover, the use
of artificial noise may have an adverse effect on the
secrecy rate in the low node density scenarios, where
more transmit power should be allocated to improve the
transmission rate between the transmitting node and its
intended receiver.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents the network and the mmWave channel
model. Section III evaluates the average achievable secrecy
rate of this network and also discusses the implementation of
uniform linear array. Section IV analyzes the use of artificial
noise on the secrecy performance. Numerical results are pro-
vided in Section V and conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a mmWave ad hoc network, where a group of
transmitting nodes are randomly distributed following a homo-
geneous Poisson point process (PPP)  with λ. The dipole
model is adopted [27], where the distance for a typical trans-
mitting node-receiver is fixed at r , and the typical receiver is
assumed to be located at the origin. Both the transmitting node
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and its corresponding receiver use directional beamforming for
data transmission, which is intercepted by multiple eavesdrop-
pers. We consider the case of passive eavesdropping without
any active attacks to deteriorate the information transmission.
The locations of eavesdroppers are modeled following an
independent homogeneous PPP e with λe. We consider the
directional beamforming and use a sectored model to analyze
the beam pattern [4], [28]–[30] (See Fig. 1 in [4]), i.e., the
effective antenna gain for an interferer i seen by the typical
receiver is expressed as
Gi =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
G2M, PrMM =
(
θ
2π
)2
,
GMGm, PrMm = θ (2π − θ)
(2π)2
,
GmGM, PrMm = θ (2π − θ)
(2π)2
,
G2m, Prmm =
(
2π − θ
2π
)2
,
(1)
where GM denotes the main-lobe gain with the beamwidth θ ,
Gm denotes the back-lobe gain, and Prk (, k ∈ {M, m})
denotes the probability that the antenna gain GGk occurs.
We assume that the maximum array gain GMGM is obtained
for the typical transmitting node-receiver.
In light of the blockage effects in the outdoor scenario,
the signal path can be LoS or NLoS. We denote fPr (R) as
the probability that a link at a distance R is LoS, while the
NLoS probability of a link is 1− fPr (R). The LoS probability
function fPr (R) can be obtained from field measurements or
stochastic blockage models [29].
We employ a short-range propagation model in which given
a distance |Xi |, the path loss function is denoted as L (|X |) =
β(max (d, |X |))−α with a reference distance d [31], where α
is the path loss exponent depending on the LoS or NLoS link,
namely α = αLoS for LoS link and α = αNLoS for NLoS
link, and β is the frequency independent constant parameter
of the path loss, which is commonly set as ( c4π fc )
2 with
c = 3 × 108m/s and the carrier frequency fc. Hence there are
different β values for different mmWave frequencies, which
allows us to examine the effects of using different mmWave
frequencies. Note that the sparse scattering mmWave environ-
ment makes many traditional fading distributions invalid for
the modeling of the mmWave channel [32]. For tractability,
we neglect small scale fading as [33] argues that fading is not
significant in LOS links with significant beamforming. Hence
the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at a typical
receiver is written as
γo = Pt G
2
ML (r)∑
i∈/o Pt Gi L (|Xi |) + σ 2o
, (2)
where Pt denotes the transmit power, |Xi | is the distance
between the typical receiver and the interferer i ∈ /o (except
the typical transmitting node), and σ 2o is the noise power.
When the eavesdropping channel is degraded under the
effect of interference, secrecy indeed becomes better. In this
paper, we focus on the worst-case eavesdropping scenario,
where all the eavesdroppers can mitigate the interference.
In fact, eavesdroppers are usually assumed to have strong
ability, and they may cooperate with each other to cancel the
interference, as seen in [34]. We assume that the eavesdropping
channels are independent of the legitimate channel.1 In such a
scenario, the most malicious eavesdropper that has the largest
SINR of the received signal dominates the secrecy rate [36].
Thus, the SINR at the most malicious eavesdropper is written
as
γe∗ = max
e∈e
{
Pt Ge L (|Xe|)
σ 2e
}
, (3)
where |Xe| is the distance between the typical transmitting
node and the eavesdropper e ∈ e, σ 2e is the power of noise
and weak interference, and Ge is the antenna gain seen from
the eavesdropper e ∈ e described by
Ge =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
GMGeM, PrMM =
θφ
(2π)2
,
GMGem, PrMm =
θ (2π − φ)
(2π)2
,
GmGeM, PrMm =
(2π − θ) φ
(2π)2
,
GmGem, Prmm =
(2π − θ)(2π − φ)
(2π)2
,
(4)
in which φ, GeM and Gem are the beamwidth of the main-lobe,
main-lobe gain and back-lobe gain of the beam pattern used
by the eavesdropper e ∈ e, respectively.
III. SECRECY EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the average achievable secrecy
rate in mmWave ad hoc networks. As shown in [37], phys-
ical layer security is commonly characterized by the secrecy
rate Rs, which is defined as
Rs =
[
log2 (1 + γo) − log2 (1 + γe∗)
]+
. (5)
Based on (5), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: In mmWave ad hoc networks, the average
achievable secrecy rate is given by
Rs =
[
R − Re∗
]+
, (6)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}, R = E [log2 (1 + γo)
]
is the average
rate of the channel between the typical transmitting node and
its receiver, and Re∗ = E
[
log2 (1 + γe∗)
]
is the average rate
of the channel between the typical transmitting node and the
most malicious eavesdropper.
Proof: We first show that the average rate R is achievable
by considering the fact that mmWave channel experiences
rapid fluctuation, and the coherence time in mmWave fre-
quencies is around an order of magnitude lower than that at
sub-6 GHz as the Doppler shift linearly scales with fre-
quency [26], [38]. Moreover, mmWave links undergo more
dramatic swings between LoS and NLoS due to the high level
of shadowing [26]. Therefore, coding over many coherence
intervals is possible, and thus the average rate R can be
achieved.
1We highlight that the secrecy in the mmWave correlated wiretap channel
is a novel and important research area, and the existing contributions at lower
frequencies can be seen in [35].
3208 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 16, NO. 5, MAY 2017
1(z) = fPr (r) e−z Pt G2Mβ(max {r,d})−αLoS + (1 − fPr (r))e−z Pt G2Mβ(max {r,d})−αNLoS (8)
2(z) = exp
(
− 2πλ
∫ ∞
0
fPr (u) (1 − 1(z, u))udu − 2πλ
∫ ∞
0
(1 − fPr (u))(1 − 2(z, u))udu
)
(9)
with
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1(z, u) =
∑
,k∈{M,m}
Prk × e−z Pt GGkβ(max {u,d})−αLoS
2(z, u) =
∑
,k∈{M,m}
Prk × e−z Pt GGkβ(max {u,d})−αNLoS
Since the malicious eavesdroppers only intercept the secrecy
massages passively without any transmissions, the channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping channels cannot
be obtained by the transmitting node, and the transmission
rate of a typical transmitting node is only dependent on the
CSI of the channel between itself and the typical receiver.
In addition, the maximum average rate in an arbitrary wiretap
channel cannot exceed Re∗ . As such, we obtain the aver-
age achievable secrecy rate in mmWave ad hoc networks
as (6).
To evaluate the average achievable secrecy rate, we first
derive the average rate R, which is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The exact average rate between the typi-
cal transmitting node and its intended receiver is given
by
R = 1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1 − 1(z))2(z)e−zσ 2o dz, (7)
where 1(z) and 2(z) are respectively given by (8) and (9),
shown at the top of this page.2
Proof: See Appendix A.
The exact average rate given in (7) can be lower bounded
as a simple expression, which is as follows.
Theorem 2: The lower bound of the average rate R is given
by
RL1 = log2
(
1 + G
2
Mβr
−α
λG¯ + NoPt
)
, (10)
where α = (αLoS − αNLoS) fPr (r) + αNLoS, the average
antenna gain G¯ = ∑,k∈{M,m} GGkPrk , and  is
 = β2π
( ∫ d
0
(
(d−αLoS − d−αNLoS)r fPr (r) + d−αNLoSr
)
dr
+
∫ ∞
d
(
(r1−αLoS − r1−αNLoS) fPr (r) + r1−αNLoS
)
dr
)
.
(11)
2We consider that the typical legitimate channel and the interfering channels
are independent, due to the fact that the coherence time of mmWave channel
is around an order of hundreds of microseconds and much shorter than today’s
cellular systems, and mmWave links experience more dramatic swings in path
loss [26].
When the LoS probability is fPr (R) = e−R [29], (10) reduces
to a closed-form expression with
 = β2π ×
[1 − e−d(1 + d)
2
(
1
dαLoS
− 1
dαNLoS
)
+(2 − αLoS, d)
2−αLoS
+ αNLoS · d
2−αNLoS
2(αNLoS − 2)
−(2 − αNLoS, d)
2−αNLoS
]
. (12)
Proof: See Appendix B.
From Theorem 2, we find that as the transmit power grows
large, the average rate is asymptotically lower bounded as
RL1 → log2
(
1 + G2Mβr−α
λG¯
)
. It is explicitly shown from (10)
that the average rate between the typical transmitting node
and its receiver is a decreasing function of transmitting
node density, and increases with narrower beam due to the
lower average interfering antenna gain. In addition, we have
the following important corollary.
Corollary 1: Given a required average rate Rth between the
typical transmitting node and its receiver, it is achievable when
the transmitting node density in the mmWave ad hoc network
satisfies
λ ≤
(
G2Mβr−α
2Rth − 1 −
No
Pt
)
G¯−1−1. (13)
From (13), we see that narrower beams allow mmWave ad
hoc networks to accommodate more transmitting nodes.
We next derive the average rate between the typical trans-
mitting node and the most malicious eavesdropper, which is
given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The exact average rate between the typical
transmitting node and the most malicious eavesdropper is
given by
Re∗ = 1ln 2
∫ ∞
0
(1 − P1 (x) P2 (x))
1 + x dx, (14)
where P1 (x) and P2 (x) are given in (15) and (16), as shown
at the top of next page, with 1 (A) representing the indicator
function that returns one if the condition A is satisfied.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Substituting (7) and (14) into (5), we can thus evaluate the
average achievable secrecy rate in this network.
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P1 (x) = exp
⎧
⎨
⎩
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
fPr(re)re
∑
,n∈{M,m}
1
(
max{re, d} <
( Pt GGenβ
xσ 2e
) 1
αLoS
)
Prndre
⎫
⎬
⎭
(15)
P2 (x) = exp
⎧
⎨
⎩
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
(1 − fPr(re))re
∑
,n∈{M,m}
1
(
max{re, d} <
( Pt GGenβ
xσ 2e
) 1
αNLoS
)
Prndre
⎫
⎬
⎭
(16)
A. Simplified LoS MmWave Model
The aforementioned analysis is derived by considering an
arbitrary LoS probability, which is general. In this subsection,
we employ a simplified LoS mmWave model, as mentioned
in [29], [39]. In this model, the mmWave link is LoS if the
distance for a typical transmitting node-receiver is not larger
than the maximum LoS distance DLoS, and otherwise it is
outage. When an LoS link between a typical transmitting node
and its receiver is established (i.e., r < DLoS), the exact
average rate between the typical transmitting node and its
intended receiver given in Theorem 1 can be simplified as
Rˆ = 1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1 − e−z Pt G2M L(r))ˆ2(z)e−zσ 2o dz, (17)
where ˆ2(z) is calculated as
ˆ2(z) = exp
{
− 2πλ
[
D2LoS
2
−
∑
,k∈{M,m}
Prk
×
(d2
2
e−z Pt G2Mβd−αLoS + α−1LoS(z Pt GGkβ)2/αLoS
×
(

(
− 2
αLoS
, z Pt GGkβD−αLoSLoS
)
−
(
− 2
αLoS
, z Pt GGkβd−αLoS
)))]}
. (18)
Here,  (·, ·) is the upper incomplete gamma function
[40, (8.350)].
It is explicitly shown from (17) that Rˆ is a decreasing
function of λ, since adding more transmitting nodes results
in larger interference.
Likewise, the exact average rate between the typical trans-
mitting node and the most malicious eavesdropper given in
Theorem 3 can be simplified as
Re∗ = 1ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1 − exp
(
−2πλe Fˆe (x)
)
1 + x dx, (19)
where the cumulative distribution function is given by
Fˆe (x)=
∑
,n∈{M,m}
(
1
(
d <η
(
G, Gen, x
)) d2
2
+ 
2 − d2
2
)
Prn
(20)
with η
(
G, Gen, x
) = ( Pt GGenβ
xσ 2e
) 1
αLoS and  =
min
(
DLoS, η
(
G, Gen, x
))
.
It is explicitly shown from (19) that Re∗ is an increasing
function of λe, which means that the exact average rate
between the typical transmitting node and the most malicious
eavesdropper increases with the number of eavesdroppers.
Substituting (17) and (19) into (6), we can obtain the
average achievable secrecy rate.
B. Uniform Linear Array
We proceed to evaluate the secrecy performance when all
the nodes in this networks are equipped with ULA. Assume
that the number of antennas possessed by each eavesdropper
and the transmitting node are denoted by Ne and N , respec-
tively, and each receiver has the same number of antennas as
its transmitting node.
For ULA configuration with q antennas, the elements are
placed along the y-axis of the propagation plane with τ
spacing. Hence, the array steering and response vectors for
the transmitting node and its receiver are written as [41]
at (ϕ, q) =
[
1, e− j
2π
ω τ sin(ϕ),. . . , e− j
2π
ω (q−1)τ sin(ϕ)
]T
(21)
and
ar (ξ, q) =
[
1, e− j 2πω τ sin(ξ),. . . , e− j 2πω (q−1)τ sin(ξ)
]T
,
(22)
respectively, where ω is the wavelength, ϕ ∼ U(0, 2π) and
ξ ∼ U(0, 2π) are the azimuth angle of departure (AoD)
and angle of arrival (AoA), respectively, and (·)T denotes
transpose. The channel model is established as H =√
L(R)A (ξr , ϕt ) with the ULA steering matrix A (ξr , ϕt ) =
ar (ξr , q)aHt (ϕt , q), where (·)H is the conjugate transpose.
We consider that matched filter (MF) beamforming is
adopted at all the nodes including eavesdroppers, the trans-
mitting nodes and their receivers for maximizing the received
signal power. Note that MF is the optimal beamforming for
eavesdroppers, since interference is negligible at the eaves-
droppers. Hence, the antenna gain for a typical transmitting
node seen by its receiver is
Go =
∣
∣
∣
∣
aHr (ξro , N)√
N
A
(
ξro , ϕto
) at (ϕto, N)√
N
∣
∣
∣
∣
2
= N2, (23)
and the antenna gain for an interferer i seen by the typical
receiver is
Gi =
∣
∣
∣
∣
aHr (ξro , N)√
N
A
(
ξri,o , ϕti,o
) at (ϕti , N)√
N
∣
∣
∣
∣
2
. (24)
Based on (21) and (22), after some manipulations, we have
Gi = 1N2
[
1 − cos(NK1(ξri,o ))
][
1 − cos(NK2(ϕti,o , ϕti ))
]
[
1 − cos(K1(ξri,o ))
][
1 − cos(K2(ϕti,o , ϕti ))
] ,
(25)
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P ULA1 (x) = exp
{
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
1
(
max{re, d} <
( Pt Ge(ϕte,o)β
xσ 2e
) 1
αLoS
) fPr(re)
2π
redϕte,odre
}
(30)
P ULA2 (x) = exp
{
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2π
0
1
(
max{re, d} <
( Pt Ge(ϕte,o)β
xσ 2e
) 1
αNLoS
)
1 − fPr(re)
2π
redϕte,odre
}
(31)
where K1
(
ξri,o
) = 2π τω (sin(ξro)− sin(ξri,o )), K2
(
ϕti,o , ϕti
) =
2π τω (sin(ϕti,o ) − sin(ϕti )).
Based on Theorem 2, the average rate between the typical
transmitting node and its intended receiver is lower bounded
as
RLULA = log2
(
1 + N
2βr−α
λG¯ULA + NoPt
)
, (26)
where ULA is given from (11) with the average antenna
gain
G¯ = E [Gi ] = 1N2 E
[1 − cos(NK1(ξri,o ))
1 − cos(K1(ξri,o ))
]
×E
[1 − cos(NK2(ϕti,o , ϕti ))
1 − cos(K2(ϕti,o , ϕti ))
]
. (27)
Since the beam-direction of the typical node and each inter-
ferer is a uniform random variable on [0, 2π], we can further
obtain
G¯ = 1
N2
∫ 2π
0
1 − cos(NK1(ξri,o ))
1 − cos(K1(ξri,o ))
1
2π
dξri,o
×
∫ 2π
0
∫ 2π
0
1 − cos(NK2(ϕti,o , ϕti ))
1 − cos(K2(ϕti,o , ϕti ))
1
4π2
dϕti,o dϕti .
(28)
Likewise, the antenna gain Ge seen from the eavesdropper
e ∈ e is
Ge
(
ϕte,o
) =
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
aHr (ξre,o , Ne)√
N
A
(
ξre,o , ϕte,o
) at (ϕto, N)√
N
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
2
=
(
Ne
N
)2 1 − cos(NK3(ϕte,o))
1 − cos(K3(ϕte,o))
, (29)
where K3
(
ϕte,o
) = 2π τω (sin(ϕte,o)− sin(ϕto)). From (29), we
find that increasing the number of antennas at the transmitting
node decreases the antenna gain obtained by the eavesdrop-
pers, which is helpful for degrading the signal strength at
the eavesdroppers. Based on Theorem 3, the exact average
rate RULAe∗ between the typical transmitting node and the most
malicious eavesdropper is given from (14) by interchanging
P1 (x) → P ULA1 (x) and P2 (x) → P ULA2 (x), where P ULA1 (x)
and P ULA2 (x) are given by (30) and (31), as shown at the top
of this page, respectively. Thus, by using ULA, the average
achievable secrecy rate can at least reach
RLs,ULA =
[
RLULA − RULAe∗
]+
. (32)
IV. ARTIFICIAL NOISE AIDED TRANSMISSION
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy performance for the
artificial noise aided transmission [21]. For this case, the total
power per transmission is Pt = PS + PA , where the power
allocated to the information signal is PS = μPt , and the power
allocated to the artificial noise is PA = (1 − μ)Pt . Here, μ is
the fraction of power assigned to the information signal. The
effective antenna gain GSi for the information signal of an
interfering i seen by the typical receiver is expressed as
GSi =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
GSMGM, Pr
S
MM =
ϑθ
(2π)2
,
GSMGm, Pr
S
Mm =
ϑ (2π − θ)
(2π)2
,
GSmGM, PrSmM =
(2π − ϑ)θ
(2π)2
,
GSmGm, PrSmm =
(2π − ϑ)(2π − θ)
(2π)2
,
(33)
where ϑ , GSM and GSm are the beamwidth of the main-lobe,
main-lobe gain and back-lobe gain for the information signal
of an interfering i , respectively. Likewise, the effective antenna
gain for the artificial noise of an interfering i seen by the
typical receiver is expressed as
G Ai =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
G AMGM, Pr
A
MM =
ςθ
(2π)2
,
G AMGm, Pr
A
Mm =
ς (2π − θ)
(2π)2
,
G AmGM, Pr AmM =
(2π − ς)θ
(2π)2
,
G AmGm, PrAmm =
(2π − ς)(2π − θ)
(2π)2
,
(34)
where ς , G AM and G Am are the beamwidth of the main-lobe,
main-lobe gain and back-lobe gain for the artificial noise
of an interfering i , respectively. The effective antenna gain
GSe and G Ae for the information signal and artificial noise of
the typical transmitting node seen by the eavesdropper e ∈ e
can be respectively given from (33) and (34) by interchanging
the parameters GM → GeM, Gm → Gem and θ → φ.
Since the beam of the artificial noise at the typical trans-
mitting node will not be directed to the typical receiver,
the artificial noise sent by the typical transmitting node has
negligible effect on the typical receiver [21], the SINR at the
typical receiver is given by
γ˜o = PS G
S
MGML (r)
∑
i∈/o
(
PS GSi + PAG Ai
)
L (|Xi |) + σ 2o
. (35)
The SINR at the most malicious eavesdropper is given by
γ˜e∗ = max
e∈e
{
PS GSe L (|Xe|)
PAG Ae L (|Xe|) + σ 2e
}
. (36)
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Following (6), the average achievable secrecy rate for the
artificial noise aided transmission is written as
R˜S =
[
R˜ − R˜∗e
]+
, (37)
where R˜ = E [log2 (1 + γ˜o)
]
and R˜∗e = E
[
log2 (1 + γ˜e∗)
]
,
R˜ and R˜∗e are given by the following theorems.
Theorem 4: The exact average rate for the artificial noise
aided transmission between the typical transmitting node and
its intended receiver is given by
R˜ = 1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1 − ˜1(z))˜2(z)e−zσ 20 dz, (38)
where ˜1(z) and ˜2(z) are respectively given by
(39) and (40), shown at the bottom of this page. In
(40), PrM = θ2π and Prm = 1 − PrM.
Proof: It can be proved by following a similar approach
shown in the Theorem 1.
Using the similar approach shown in the Appendix B, the
exact average rate given in (38) can be lower bounded as a
simple expression, which is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The lower bound of the average rate R˜ is
R˜L1 = log2
(
1 + G
S
MGMβr
−α
λ˜ + NoμPt
)
, (41)
where ˜ is
˜ =
(
G¯S + 1 − μ
μ
G¯ A
)
β2π
×
( ∫ d
0
(d−αLoS − d−αNLoS)r fPr (r) + d−αNLoSrdr
+
∫ ∞
d
(r1−αLoS − r1−αNLoS) fPr (r) + r1−αNLoSdr
)
.
(42)
with
G¯S =
∑
,k∈{M,m} G
S
 GkPr
S
k, G¯ A =
∑
ν,k∈{M,m} G
A
ν GkPr
A
νk .
Based on Theorem 5, we have the following important
corollary.
Corollary 2: The required average rate R˜th between the
typical transmitting node and its receiver can be achieved when
the transmitting node density satisfies
λ ≤
(
GSMGMβr
−α
2R˜th − 1 −
No
μPt
)
˜−1. (43)
TABLE I
PATH LOSS EXPONENT FOR mm-WAVE OUTDOOR CHANNELS [42], [43]
TABLE II
ANTENNA PATTERN [44]
We next present the average rate between the typical
transmitting node and the most malicious eavesdropper as
follows.
Theorem 6: The exact average rate for the artificial noise
aided transmission between the typical transmitting node and
the most malicious eavesdropper is given by
R˜∗e =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − P˜1 (x) P˜2 (x)
)
1 + x dx, (44)
where P˜1 (x) and P˜2 (x) are respectively given by
(45) and (46), as shown at the bottom of the next page.
In (45) and (46), PreM = φ2π and Prem = 1 − PreM.
Proof: It can be proved by following a similar approach
shown in the Theorem 2.
Substituting (38) and (44) into (37), we obtain the aver-
age achievable secrecy rate for the artificial noise aided
transmission.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Numerical results are presented to understand the impact of
mmWave channel characteristics and large antenna array on
the achievable secrecy rate. We assume that the LoS proba-
bility function is fPr (R) = e−R with 1/ = 141.4 m [29].
The mmWave bandwidth is BW = 2 GHz, the noise figure
is Nf = 10 dB, the noise power is σ 2o = σ 2e = −174 +
10 log 10(BW)+Nf dBm, and the reference distance is d = 1.
We focus on the carrier frequency at 28 GHz, 38 GHz,
60 GHz, and 73GHz, in which their LoS and NLoS path loss
exponents are shown in Table I based on the practical channel
measurements [42], [43].
˜1(z) = fPr (r) e−z PSG SMGMβ(max {r,d})−αLoS + (1 − fPr (r))e−z PSG SMGMβ(max {r,d})−αNLoS (39)
˜2(z) = exp
(
− 2πλ
∫ ∞
0
fPr (u) (1 − ˜1(z, u))udu − 2πλ
∫ ∞
0
(1 − fPr (u))(1 − ˜2(z, u))udu
)
(40)
with
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
˜1(z, u) =
∑
,ν,k∈{M,m}
PrSkPr
A
νk
Prk
× e−z(PSG S Gk+PAG Aν Gk)β(max {u,d})−αLoS
˜2(z, u) =
∑
,ν,k∈{M,m}
PrSkPr
A
νk
Prk
× e−z(PSG S Gk+PAG Aν Gk )β(max {u,d})−αNLoS
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Fig. 1. Effects of transmit power on the average achievable secrecy rate
at 28 GHz, 38 GHz, 60 GHz and 73 GHz: λ = 50/km2, λe = 100/km2,
N = 16, and r = 15 m.
A. Average Achievable Secrecy Rate
In this subsection, we consider the uniform planar
array (UPA) with the antenna pattern shown in Table II.
The transmitting nodes and their receivers are equipped with
N antennas each, and each eavesdropper is equipped with
Ne antennas.
Fig. 1 shows the effects of transmit power on the average
achievable secrecy rate. We utilize four commonly-considered
mmWave carrier frequencies, namely 28 GHz, 38 GHz,
60 GHz and 73 GHz, which have different β values given
by β = ( c4π fc )2 in Section II and path loss exponents
in Table I. The analytical curves are obtained from (6),
which are validated by the Monte Carlo simulations marked
by ‘+’. We observe that there exist optimal transmit power
values for maximizing average achievable secrecy rate at all
the commonly-considered mmWave frequencies. In the low
transmit power regime, better secrecy performance is achieved
at 28 GHz, and higher average achievable secrecy rate can be
obtained in the higher mmWave frequency band (60 GHz and
73 GHz) as the transmit power becomes large. The reason
is that in the low transmit power regime, mmWave ad hoc
network tends to be noise-limited, and mmWave link at lower
mmWave frequencies experiences lower path loss and has
stronger signal strength, which results in better performance.
However, in the high transmit power regime, mmWave ad hoc
network becomes interference-limited. In this case, the inter-
ference received by a legitimate node becomes lower and the
signal strength of the eavesdropper is also reduced at higher
Fig. 2. Effects of transmitting node density on the average achievable secrecy
rate at 60 GHz: N = 16, Ne = 16, r = 15 m, and Pt = 30 dBm.
mmWave frequencies, due to the higher path loss at higher
mmWave frequencies. In addition, it is shown that the secrecy
performance at 60 GHz is better than that at 73 GHz when the
transmit power is large enough, due to the fact that mmWave
link at 60 GHz has higher LoS path loss exponent than that at
73 GHz [42], [43] (2.25 at 60 GHz and 2 at 73 GHz in this fig-
ure based on the practical channel measurements in [42], [43]),
which leads to less interference received by a legitimate node
and lower signal strength of the eavesdropper at 60 GHz.
Additionally, using the antenna pattern in Table II, average
achievable secrecy rate is a bit lower at Ne = 16 than that at
Ne = 4, due to fact that more effective antenna gain obtained
by eavesdroppers using UPA with Ne = 16, which deteriorates
the secrecy performance.
Fig. 2 shows the effects of transmitting node density on
the average achievable secrecy rate at 60 GHz. We see that
when increasing the transmitting node density, the average
achievable secrecy rate declines. The reason is that when
the transmitting nodes are dense, mmWave ad hoc networks
becomes interference-limited, and the interference caused by
other transmitting nodes dominate the performance. It is
confirmed that in the large-scale mmWave ad hoc networks,
more eavesdroppers have a detrimental effect on the secrecy.
Fig. 3 shows the effects of different typical distances on the
average rate at 60 GHz. The green solid and dashed curves
with triangles obtained from (7) and (10) represent the exact
and lower-bound average rate between the typical transmitting
node and its intended receiver, respectively, and the orange
solid curve with circles obtained from (14) represents the
P˜1 (x) = exp
{
− 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
fPr(re)re
∑
,ν,n∈{M,m}
PrSnPr
A
νn
Pren
1
(
max{re, d} <
( PS GS G
e
nβ − PAG Aν Genβx
xσ 2e
) 1
αLoS
)
dre
}
(45)
P˜2 (x) = exp
{
− 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
(1 − fPr(re))re
∑
,ν,n∈{M,m}
PrSnPr
A
νn
Pren
1
(
max{re, d} <
( PS GS G
e
nβ − PAG Aν Genβx
xσ 2e
) 1
αNLoS
)
dre
}
(46)
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Fig. 3. Effects of transmit power with different typical distances on the
average rate at 28 GHz: Pt = 10 dBm, λ = 10/km2, λe = 100/km2, N = 16,
and Ne = 16.
Fig. 4. Effects of different antenna numbers on the average achievable secrecy
rate at 38 GHz: λ = 50/km2, λe = 100/km2, r = 20 m, Pt = 10 dBm,
ξro = π/3, ϕto = π/3.
average rate in the most malicious eavesdropping channel. We
observe that the lower bound curves can efficiently predict
the performance behavior. It is shown that when the commu-
nication distance grows large, there is a significant decrease
in the average achievable secrecy rate, due to the fact that
the average rate between the typical transmitting node and its
receiver decreases while the average rate in the most malicious
eavesdropper’s channel is unaltered. This illustrates that the
secrecy rate in mmWave ad hoc networks is highly dependent
on the communication distance between the transmitting node
and its receiver.
B. Average Achievable Secrecy Rate With ULA
In this subsection, we consider the ULA configuration, and
choose the antenna spacing as 	τ = 12ω. The results in
Figs. 4 and 5 are obtained from (32).
Fig. 5. Effects of different node densities on the average achievable secrecy
rate at 38 GHz: N = 16, Ne = 4, r = 20 m, Pt = 10 dBm, ξro = π/3,
ϕto = π/3.
Fig. 4 shows the average achievable secrecy rate with differ-
ent number of antennas at the transmitting nodes and eaves-
droppers. It is observed that the average achievable secrecy
rate increases with the number of antennas at the transmitting
nodes, and decreases when eavesdroppers are equipped with
more antennas. Moreover, the average achievable secrecy rate
becomes very small when the transmitting node only has a
couple of antennas. The reason is that the information signal
beam is not narrow and more eavesdroppers can receive strong
signals when they have more receive antennas.
Fig. 5 shows the achievable average achievable secrecy rate
for different node densities. We see that more eavesdrop-
pers located in the networks are indeed harmful for secrecy.
However, when the density of transmitting nodes increases,
the secrecy performance also degrades, which indicates that
interference can still be a concern for super dense transmitting
nodes without highly directional antennas.
C. Average Achievable Secrecy Rate With Artificial Noise
In this subsection, we examine the effects of artificial
noise (AN) on the secrecy performance.
Fig. 6 shows the effects of transmit power with/without AN
at 60 GHz. We consider that the antenna beam patterns of
sending information signal and AN at the transmitting node
are (GSM, G
S
m, ϑ) = (3 dB,−3 dB, 45°) and (G AM, G Am, ς) =
(3 dB,−3 dB, 45°), respectively, and the antenna beam pat-
tern of only sending information signal without AN at the
transmitting node is (GM, Gm, θ) = (10 dB,−10 dB, 15°),
as seen in [4]. The analytical curves without/with AN are
obtained from (6) and (37), respectively. We see that when the
transmitting nodes are not dense (λ = 20/km2 in this figure),
the average achievable secrecy rate increases with the transmit
power. In this case, the use of AN with power allocation
factor μ = 0.85 may not be able to improve secrecy,3
3Note that the optimal power allocation for AN aided transmission is
infeasible in the passive eavesdropping scenario, where the CSI of the
eavesdropping channels cannot be obtained by the transmitting node or
legitimate receiver.
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Fig. 6. Effects of transmit power with/without AN on the average achievable
secrecy rate at 60 GHz: λ = 20/km2, λe = 300/km2, r = 50 m, and
μ = 0.85.
Fig. 7. Effects of transmit power with AN on the average achievable
secrecy rate at 28 and 38 GHz: λ = 30/km2, λe = 500/km2, r = 20 m,
μ = 0.85, (GM, Gm, θ) = (15 dB,−15 dB, 4.5°), (G SM, G Sm, θ) =
(10 dB,−10 dB, 15°), (G AM, G Am, θ) = (3 dB, −3 dB, 45°), (GeM, Gem, φ) =
(3 dB,−3 dB, 45°).
and more power should be allocated to the information signal,
to combat the severe interference and mmWave pathloss. Such
phenomenon has also been mentioned in the prior work [45]
with lower frequencies (See Fig. 7 in [45]), which is different
from the results in the non large-scale physical layer security
model. Moreover, it is indicated that eavesdroppers using wide
beam pattern can intercept more information.
Fig. 7 shows the effects of transmit power with/without
AN in different frequency bands, i.e., 28 GHz and 38 GHz.
The lower-bound results with/without AN are obtained by
using (41) and (10) to calculate the average rate between the
transmitting node and its receiver, respectively. We see that the
lower bound results can well approximate the exact ones when
the transmit power is not large (< 30 dBm in this figure). The
average achievable secrecy rate at 28 GHz is larger than that
Fig. 8. Effects of transmit power allocation factor on the average achievable
secrecy rate at 28 and 38 GHz: λ = 50/km2, λe = 500/km2, Pt = 30 dBm,
(GM, Gm, θ) = (10 dB,−10 dB, 15°), (G SM, G Sm, ϑ) = (3 dB,−3 dB, 45°),
(G AM, G
A
m, ς) = (3 dB,−3 dB, 45°).
at 38 GHz, which indicates that the use of lower frequency
bands could achieve better secrecy performance. The average
achievable secrecy rate increases with transmit power, and the
use of AN cannot improve the secrecy. The reason is that
in this circumstance, more power should be used to enhance
the transmission rate between the transmitting node and its
receiver.
Fig. 8 shows the effects of transmit power allocation factor
on the average achievable secrecy rate. We see that there exists
an optimal μ to maximize the average achievable secrecy
rate, which reveals that AN can help enhance secrecy when
the power allocation between the information signal and AN
is properly set. Again, we see that larger communication
distance r deteriorates the secrecy performance. In addition,
for a given r , secrecy transmission at 28 GHz is better than
that at 38 GHz.
VI. CONCLUSION
We concentrated on the secure communication in mmWave
ad hoc networks by using physical layer security. We derived
the average achievable secrecy rate without/with artificial
noise. A tractable approach was developed to evaluate the
average achievable secrecy rate when nodes are equipped
with ULA. The results have highlighted the impacts of differ-
ent mmWave frequencies, transmit power, node density and
antenna gains on the secrecy performance. Important insights
have been provided into the interplay between transmit power
and mmWave frequency. When the node density is dense,
the interference from nearby nodes dominates the secrecy
performance. It is shown that power allocation between the
information signal and AN needs to be carefully determined
for secrecy performance enhancement.
In this paper, we assume that the distance r between the
typical transmitting node and its receiver is constant. In the
future work, we highlight that it is important to study the case
of the dynamic r following a certain distribution to model the
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specified scenarios. In addition, new antenna pattern models
are needed to well characterize the effective antenna gain for a
random interferer seen by the typical receiver when the number
of mmWave antennas grows large.
APPENDIX A
A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 1
Using [46, Lemma 1], the average rate R is calculated as
R = E [log2 (1 + γ0)
] = E
[
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1 − e−zγo)e−zdz
]
= 1
ln 2
E
[∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1 − e−zY )e−z(I+σ 20 )dz
]
(a)= 1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
z
(1 − E
[
e−zY
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1(z)
) E
[
e−zI
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2(z)
e−zσ 20 dz, (A.1)
where step (a) is obtained based on the fact that Y and I
are independent in the ad hoc networks, Y = Pt G2M L (r) is
dependent on the LoS or NLoS condition given a distance r ,
and the interference I is
I =
∑
i∈/o Pt Gi L (|Xi |). (A.2)
Based on the law of total expectation, we can directly obtain
1(z) as (8). Then, we see that 2(z) is the Laplace trans-
form of I . To solve it, using the thinning theorem [47], the
mmWave transmitting nodes are divided into two independent
PPPs, namely LoS point process LoS with density function
λ fPr(R), and NLoS point process NLoS with density function
λ(1 − fPr(R)). Accordingly, by using the Slivnyak’s
theorem [47], 2(z) is given by
2(z) = E
[
e−zI
] = E
[
e−z(ILoS+INLoS)
]
= E [e−zILoS]E [e−zINLoS] (A.3)
with
⎧
⎨
⎩
ILoS =
∑
i∈LoS
Pt Gi L (|Xi |),
INLoS =
∑
i∈NLoS Pt Gi L (
|Xi |).
(A.4)
By applying the Laplace functional of the PPP [47],
E
[
e−zILoS
] = exp
(
− 2πλ ×
∫ ∞
0
fPr (u)
×
(
1 − E
[
e−z Pt Gi β(max {u,d})−αLoS
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
)
udu
)
.
(A.5)
Based on the array gain distribution in (1) and the law of total
expectation, 1 is obtained as
1(z, u)=
∑
,k∈{M,m}
Prk × e−z Pt GGkβ(max {u,d})−αLoS . (A.6)
Likewise, we can derive E
[
e−zINLoS
]
. Then, we get 2(z)
in (9). Based on (A.1) and (9), we attain the desired result
in (7) and complete the proof.
APPENDIX B
A DETAILED DERIVATION OF EQ. (10)
The average rate between the typical transmitting node and
its intended receiver can be tightly lower bounded as [48]
R¯L1 = log2
(
1 + eE[ln γo]
)
, (B.1)
where E
[
ln γo
]
is calculated as
E
[
ln γo
] = E
[
ln
(
Pt G2Mβr
−αo
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z1
+ E
[
ln
(
1
∑
i∈/o Pt Giβ
∣
∣Xi,o
∣
∣−αi + No
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z2
.
(B.2)
Since the typical link can be either LoS or NLoS, using the
law of total probability, Z1 is calculated as
Z1 = ln
(
Pt G2Mβ
)
− ( fPr (r) αLoS + (1 − fPr (r)) αNLoS) ln r, (B.3)
where αLoS and αNLoS are the path loss exponents of the LoS
and the NLoS, respectively.
Considering the convexity of ln
(
1
1+x
)
and using Jensen’s
inequality, we derive the lower bound on the Z2 as
ZL2 = ln
(
1
E
[∑
i∈/o Pt Giβ
∣
∣Xi,o
∣
∣−αi
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸

+No
)
. (B.4)
Using a similar approach in (A.3),  is derived as
 = E
[∑
i∈LoS
Pt Giβ
(
max {∣∣Xi,o
∣
∣ , d}−αLoS
)]
+E
[∑
i∈NLoS
Pt Giβ
(
max {∣∣Xi,o
∣
∣ , d}−αNLoS
)]
(b)= Pt G¯β2πλ ×
( ∫ d
0
(
(d−αLoS − d−αNLoS)r fPr (r)
+ d−αNLoSr)dr
+
∫ ∞
d
(
(r1−αLoS − r1−αNLoS) fPr (r) + r1−αNLoS
)
dr
)
,
(B.5)
where G¯ is the average array gain. Here, step (b) results from
using Campbell’s theorem [27]. Based on (1) and using the
law of total expectation, G¯ is calculated as
G¯ = E {Gi } =
∑
,k∈{M,m} GkPrk . (B.6)
Substituting (B.3), (B.4) and (B.5) into (B.2), we obtain
E {ln γo} in (B.1), and the desired result (10).
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APPENDIX C
A DETAILED DERIVATION OF THEOREM 2
The average rate Re∗ is calculated as
Re∗ = E
[
log2 (1 + γe∗)
]
= 1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − Fγe∗ (x)
)
1 + x dx, (C.1)
where Fγe∗ (·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of γe∗ . By using the thinning theorem [27], the eavesdroppers
are divided into the LoS point process LoSe with density func-
tion λe fPr(R), and NLoS point process NLoSe with density
function λe(1 − fPr(R)). Then, Fγe∗ (·) is given by
Fγe∗ (x) = Pr (γe∗ < x)
= Pr
(
max
{
γ LoSe∗ , γ
NLoS
e∗
}
< x
)
= Pr
(
γ LoSe∗ < x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1(x)
Pr
(
γ NLoSe∗ < x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2(x)
, (C.2)
where
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
γ LoSe∗ = max
e∈LoSe
{
Pt Ge L (|Xe|)
σ 2e
}
,
γ NLoSe∗ = max
e∈NLoSe
{
Pt Ge L (|Xe|)
σ 2e
}
.
(C.3)
We first derive P1 (x) as
P1 (x)
= Pr
(
γ LoSe∗ < x
)
= E
⎡
⎣
∏
e∈LoSe
Pr
(
Pt Geβ (max {re, d})−αLoS
σ 2e
< x
)
⎤
⎦
(c)= exp
{
− 2πλe ×
∫ ∞
0
Pr
( Pt Geβ (max {re, d})−αLoS
σ 2e
> x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸

× fPr(re)redre
}
, (C.4)
where step (c) is obtained by using the Laplace functional.
Based on the law of total probability,  is calculated as
 =
∑
,n∈{M,m}
1
(
max{re, d} <
( Pt GGenβ
xσ 2e
) 1
αLoS
)
Prn,
(C.5)
Substituting (C.5) into (C.4), we get P1 (x) in (15). Then,
P2 (x) is similarly derived as (16).
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